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Abstract

Among the available selection strategies (e.g., top down selection), sliding bands with
minority preference selection was shown to be the most effective at striking a balance
between reducing adverse impact with minimal test utility loss. Unfortunately, all
previous research into selection strategy effectiveness failed to model job acceptance
rates, a variable shown to decrease overall test utility (Murphy, 1986). In this study we
compared the utility and adverse impact ratios obtained from strict top down and sliding
bands with minority preference selection strategies in which we varied selection ratios,
job acceptance rates, and sample sizes. Across all conditions, utility and adverse impact
ratios were found to be lower than was demonstrated in previous research which ignored
job acceptance rates. Only one of our four hypotheses was supported in this study. We
found that differences in adverse impact ratios between top down selection and banding
with race preferential selection was reduced when high scoring minority applicants
refused offers at a rate higher than high scoring majority applicants. Thus, the benefits
that employers expect to see when utilizing the sliding band with minority preference
selection strategy are not as great as previously believed.
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Introduction and Review of the Literature
There is a well known dilemma that occurs when employers seek to select the best
candidates for job openings and create a diverse workforce. This dilemma occurs because
minority groups often score lower that majority groups on many of the more popular
selection tests. Thus, selecting top scoring candidates often leads to adverse impact;
whereas, deliberately selecting more members from the lower scoring group will lead to
lower test utility (Campion et al., 2001; Cascio, Outtz, Zedeck, & Goldstein, 1991;
Sackett & Roth, 1991; Sackett & Wilk, 1994). Banding is a strategy that is used as a
solution to this dilemma.
Since selection tests are not perfect measures and thereby represent a certain
amount of unreliability, small differences between scores on a selection test do not
necessarily mean that the higher scoring individual will outperform the lower scoring
individual on the job. Based on this notion, banding treats individual scores that fall
within a specified range as identical. Employers can then deliberately select minority
candidates from the score within the band in order to create a diverse workforce and
maintain high economic utility of the selection tests (Cascio et al.. 199]; Murphy &
Myors, 1995; Sackett & Roth, 1991).
The purpose of this study is to challenge the results of studies (e.g., Cascio et al.,
1991; Sackett & Roth, 1991) that have concluded that banding is the preferred solution to
the dilemma that employers face. In this study we will examine the effects that the use of
banding strategies have on utility and adverse impact when job acceptance rates are less
than 100%. The results will increase the knowledge about the effectiveness of using such
a strategy for achieving a diverse workforce and maintaining high economic utility.
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The Dilemma that Faces Employers
Employers have the option to utilize several methods when selecting the best
candidates for job openings. Candidates are often selected by their scores on a test or a
series of selection procedures (e.g., tests of cognitive or physical ability, personality
inventories, weighted application blanks, and situational tests) designed to predict job
performance (Cascio et al., 1991; Siskin, 1995). A cutoff score is usually implemented on
these predictors as a means of separating more qualified candidates from less qualified
candidates. A cutoff score is the point within a distribution of scores that separates scores
that pass from those that fail. A passing score meets or exceeds the cutoff; a failing score
falls below it.
A dilemma occurs when employers try to reach optimal levels of economic utility
while also trying to achieve workforce diversity when selecting job candidates. In most
circumstances, reaching one of these goals prohibits achieving the other goal because
many minority groups have lower scores on some of the more popular selection tests
(Campion et al.. 2001; Cascio et ai. 199]; Sackett & Roth, 1991; Sackett & Wilk, 1994).
Although under some conditions civil rights laws regulate the achievement of a
diverse workforce, organizations also seek to achieve a diverse workforce because it may
very well contribute to the overall success. Examples of such reasons include making the
organization more attractive to highly qualified minority candidates and customers or
creating better solutions to problems through the benefits of heterogeneous groups
(Sackett & Wilk, 1994).
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Referral Methods
Cascio et al. (1991) explored the statistical implications of six common methods
used in setting cutoff scores. These methods, known as referral methods, describe
specific ways in which test scores will be used to make selection decisions. Referral
methods include the following: strict (i.e., race neutral) top down referral in order of the
test scores; within group percentile referral; fixed bands, using random referral within
bands; fixed bands, using nonrandom diversity based referral within bands; sliding bands,
using random referral within bands; and sliding bands, using nonrandom, diversity based
referral within bands.
Strict top down referral is the traditional model for personnel selection. It involves
selecting the candidates with the highest scores on a test or a series of selection
procedures without regard to group membership (i.e., sex or race) or any measurement
error that may be present in these assessments. Applicants are selected in a top down
fashion, starting with the highest score, until all positions are filled. Top down referral
results in the highest levels of overall performance and economic utility of the test. This
method also results in the highest levels of adverse impact of any of the other referral
methods. Thus, it is not the preferred method for creating a diverse workforce (Aguinis,
Cortina, & Goldberg. 1998; Campion et al., 2001; Cascio et al., 1991; Murphy, 1994;
Murphy & Osten, 1995; Siskin, 1995).
In the past, within group percentile referral methods (also known as race norming
when done by race) have been used to eliminate adverse impact. This method involves
selecting candidates according to their percentile ranking within their group. This method
is generally used on selection procedures that yield mean differences between gender or
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ethnic groups and result in adverse impact (Sackett & Roth, 1991). If this method is used,
it creates the highest selection of minority candidates and eliminates adverse impact but
often leads to losses in overall performance and economic utility of the test. This method
is often criticized because it ignores obtained raw scores difference between minority and
nonminority candidates. A minority candidate could have a score of 70 and be selected
over a nonminority candidate with a score of 85 if that candidate's percentile rank was
higher within his or her racial or ethnic group. Furthermore, race norming is explicitly
prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Campion et al., 2001; Murphy, 1994; Murphy
& Osten, 1995).
Banding
The latter four of these referral methods are forms of banding. Banding has gained
popularity because it serves as an alternative to top down selection and helps employers
make decisions when faced with the dilemma of creating a diversified workforce and
achieving high levels of economic utility from a selection test (Campion et al., 2001).
Tests and psychological assessments are never perfect measures and are plagued by
certain amounts of unreliability. Banding is based on the notion that small differences in
test scores do not necessarily mean that the higher scoring individuals will out perform
the lower scoring individual due to the inherent unreliability of the test. Thus, individuals
with scores within a specified range of scores are treated as if the scores are identical
(Cascio et al., 1991; Murphy & Myors, 1995; Sackett & Roth, 1991).
Statistical data on the error of measurement within the test, the social value,
utility, and desire to create workforce diversity influence are variables that influence
which candidate will be selected. The various forms of banding differ in the ways that the
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test data are incorporated, but usually do not differ in the social and economic goals
associated with this method (Cascio et al., 1991). Most of the research on banding has
focused on how banding strategies can be used to reduce adverse impact and minimize
losses in utility. Evidence has been found that supports this notion (Cascio et al., 1991;
Report of the Scientific Affairs Committee, 1994; Sackett & Roth. 1991).
Social Value of Banding
Banding is commonly used to reduce the levels of adverse impact that may result
from a typical selection test. If two ethnic groups differ in their test score means,
relatively few members from the lower scoring group will be selected on the basis of
their scores. Banding is a way of selecting candidates that can result in a greater number
of minority candidates being selected and lowers the probability of adverse impact
(Murphy & Osten, 1995). Campion et al. (2001) pointed out that the use of banding has
increased since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Banding is not a new concept,
however. Most organizations utilize some form of banding, whether it is a pass/fail
cutoff, a descriptive classification of candidates based on some scored criterion, or a
letter grade assigned to a group of scores, which is done in the academic setting.
Statistical Rationale for Banding
The size, or width, of a band is determined by four variables: the reliability of the
test, the standard deviation of the test, a constant of 1.41 (i.e.. the square root of two), and
how confident one wants to be that two scores are reliably different from each other.
Lower reliabilities lead to larger bandwidths. Increased confidence (e.g.. 99% versus
95%) and/or larger standard deviation of test scores also lead to larger bandwidths. The
confidence value should be one tailed (e.g., 1.65 for 95% confidence) because all scores
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are compared against the highest score in the band. Scores outside the band are reliably
lower than the highest score in the band (assuming sliding bands). The equation for
bandwidth is given below.

Bandwidth = C X SDx [sqrt(l-rxx)} X [sqrt(2)]

(1)

Where
C is the confidence value (e.g., 1.65 for 1 -tailed)
SDx is the standard deviation of the test
rxx is the reliability of the test

Once bandwidth is established, the first band is formed by subtracting the
bandwidth from the highest score. All scores in that range are in the band. All scores
outside the range are outside the band. For example, if bandwidth is 10 points and the
highest score is 98, then the band includes all scores from 98 to 88. A score of 87 is
outside the band and is considered, given the error of measurement on the test, to be
reliably lower than 98. A score of 88, however, is considered to be the same score as 98,
given the amount of measurement error in the test.
Bandwidth Issues
Statistically, bandwidth varies according to the reliability of the test, the standard
deviation of the test, and the confidence interval (C) placed on the band. The confidence
interval is the only area that the employer has statistical control over when creating the
band. A higher confidence interval creates a wider band and incorporates more members
from a lower scoring group. It is not uncommon to see a 30% increase in bandwidth
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when moving from a 95% to 99% confidence interval, or a 50% increase in bandwidth
when moving from a 68% to 95% confidence interval. A higher confidence interval
creates greater assurance that candidates outside of the band reliably differ from the
highest score within the band (Murphy, 2001).
Campion et al. (2001) suggested that further research needs to be conducted to
determine other factors that may be relevant when creating a band. These areas include
the nature of the job, the legal and political environment pertaining to a diverse
workforce, and the business necessity for a diverse workforce. For instance, they stated
that bandwidth should be narrower for jobs that involve high risks for incorrect decisions
(e.g., police officer) and should be wider for jobs that are low in risk. Narrower bands
would make it less probable that lower scoring candidates to be included and lower the
risk of selecting a candidate with a lower true score that would perform worse in the
actual job setting.
Fixed vs. Sliding Bands
There are two forms of banding: fixed or sliding. Both reference the same
bandwidth for a given standard error of measurement and confidence interval. Both types
also reference the highest observed score to create the upper point of the band. However,
they differ in the constancy of the candidates within the band (Murphy & Osten, 1995).
In a fixed band, the location of the band (e.g.. scores ranging from 86 to 95) remains
constant. An example of fixed bands exists in the college grading system. This system
groups a specified range of scores and assigns a letter grade to scores within that range.
Thus scores of 80-89 might be considered equal and all translate into a "B" letter grade,
and scores of 89 and 90 might be treated as different and translate into "B" and "A" letter
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grades (Murphy, 1994). Candidates within fixed bands are selected through random or
nonrandom procedures until the band is exhausted of candidates. If more job openings
remain after the top band has been depleted of candidates, candidates from a second band
are chosen (Cascio et al., 1991).
Sliding bands differ from fixed bands because their location changes every time
the top scorer is chosen, regardless of whether or not other candidates remain within the
band. If the top scorer is chosen and other candidates remain within the same band, the
next highest remaining candidate is then used as a reference point for the formation of a
new band. Thus, the highest scorer outside of the original band (which was previously
considered different from the highest scores) may now be included into the top band and
considered statistically equal to the remaining scores within that band. Sliding bands
provide more opportunities for selection of minority candidates than do fixed bands
because they move through the distribution more quickly (Murphy & Osten, 1995). They
have been shown to produce minority selection rates comparable to the proportion of
minorities within the applicant pool (Cascio et al., 1991; Sackett & Roth. 1991).
Selection Wilhin Bands
Once a band is formed, selection of candidates within the band can be random or
nonrandom. Random selection allows for each candidate within the band to have an equal
chance of being selected and is used with the rationale that all candidates within the band
are not reliably different from each other and therefore performance differences should
not exist. Nonrandom selection occurs when applicants are chosen on some criteria other
than their observed score on the test in question (e.g., diversity, job experience, training,
seniority, score on another test). Use of minority preference as a tie breaker is done to
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reduce levels of adverse impact and create optimum economic utility for the test or
selection procedure (Cascio et al., 1991; Cascio, Goldstein, Outtz. & Zedeek, 1995;
Murphy & Osten, 1995).
Sackett and Roth (1991) reported that random selection within bands creates the
same rate of minority hiring as strict top down selection. Banding can only be expected to
increase minority hiring when a nonrandom procedure with minority preference is used.
Specifically, sliding bands with minority preference selection creates the highest rate of
minority hiring of the banding approaches (Cascio et al., 1991; Sackett & Roth 1991).
Cascio et al. (1991) reported a 47% minority hiring rate when sliding bands were used
with minority preference, which did not result in adverse impact (i.e.. the 4/5 th rule was
not violated). In comparison, the strict top down and the fixed band with minority
preference approaches resulted in 20% minority hiring rates, which resulted in adverse
impact. The sliding band with random selection resulted in 14% minority hiring rate,
which also resulted in adverse impact. Thus, sliding bands with diversity based referral
may be the preferred strategy for employers desiring both high utility and diversity from
their selection tests.
Selection within the band is also affected by the characteristics of the applicant
pool. The proportion of applicants from the lower scoring group, group differences in
mean test scores, and group differences in the standard deviation of the test scores all
affect the outcome that a banding strategy will produce. The proportion of applicants
from the lower scoring group affects the total number of candidates w ho will be selected
from that group. If there is a low proportion, fewer candidates will be selected from that
group. The inverse is true for a high proportion of candidates. Likewise, the differences
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in mean test scores between two groups affect the selection likelihood of a candidate
from the lower scoring group. Larger differences between mean scores of the two groups
result in less probability of the lower scoring group being selected. Smaller differences
result in a higher probability of selection. The difference in the standard deviation of the
two groups will also affect the selection outcome. If the standard deviation is large within
either group, it will increase the number of applicants selected from the lower scoring
group (Murphy & Osten, 1995).
The selection ratio can also affect the proportion of candidates chosen from the
lower scoring group when bands are used. Lower scoring candidates benefit the least if
the selection ratio is very high or low and the reliability of the test is very high. The
number of candidates chosen from the lower scoring group is most beneficial (i.e.,
candidates from the lower scoring group have a higher probability of selection) when the
selection ratio is moderate and the reliability of the test is low (Murphy, 1 994; Murphy &
Osten, 1995; Sackett & Roth, 1991). Therefore, the same banding approach may be
applied to different situations and have different results as a function of dissimilar
selection ratios (Report of the Academic Affairs Committee, 1994).
Test Utility and Banding
Test utility refers to how useful a test is to the organization. Sackett and Roth
(1991) suggested that banding would result in overall losses in selection utility in
comparison to top down referral. Specifically, wider bands result in the selection of lower
test score averages. Therefore, narrower bands result in higher utility than wider bands.
Utility of the band is also affected by how the selection occurs within the band (Murphy
1994). According to Zedeck, Outtz, Cascio, & Goldstein (1991). it is reasonable for an
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organization to suffer some loss in utility in order to improve the diversification of their
workforce. Banding is one alternative to top down referral that allows for minimal losses
of utility in an effort to create diversity. Zedeck et al. (1991) referenced the Cascio et al.
(1991) data set to support their statement. Cascio et al. reported a mean score of 88.79 for
sliding bands with minority preference in comparison to a score of 89.81 for a race blind,
top down approach. The similarity of mean scores illustrates the minimal loss in utility
when the banding strategy is used in comparison to the top down approach.
Criticisms of Banding
Kehoe and Tenopyr (1994) illustrated a flaw that is evident within banding. Given
that candidates within the band are considered equal due to measurement within the test,
retest data should show different scores for candidates within the band. However, their
retest data showed that given typical levels of reliability and confidence (i.e.. 95%)
candidates at the top of the band can be 25 times more likely to score higher than
candidates at the bottom of the band. Using criterion data, they also showed similar data
from which they concluded that scorers at the top of the band could be twice as likely to
outperform scorers at the bottom of the band while on the job. However, contrary to the
findings of Kehoe and Tenopyr. Siskin (1995) presented a mathematical model that
illustrated that in most situations, the top scorer in the band is only slightly more likely to
outperform the bottom scorer.
Aguinis et al. (1998) also agreed with the postulate that performance levels differ
within a band. They reported that applicants that fall within the same band can easily
have different performance levels. Along the same line, Schmidt (1991) reported that the
band must then be formed on the bases of a regression line that predicts job performance
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from test scores. If a band is formed based on this principle, tests with a validity of .50
will include 97% of all candidates at the 95% confidence interval. Essentially, all
candidates would be placed in the same band, rendering banding virtually useless
(Campion et al., 2001).
Another criticism of banding concerns the motives that people have when using
an unreliable test. Since greater unreliability within a test results in a wider bandwidth,
people could purposely use less reliable tests to create a wider band. However, this
approach leads to a less valid test and is considered unethical, which reduces the
likelihood that it will occur (Cascio et al., 1995). Cascio et al. noted that this approach
could occur for top down selection as well, but critics only make the point in reference to
banding. Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, banding still offers a way for
organizations to meet the dual goals of high utility and workforce diversity.
Legality of Banding
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 illustrated the controversy surrounding the issue of
minority preference in selection procedures by prohibiting any group based score
adjustments. Thus, any banding procedure that is used for the reason of minority
preference could be successfully challenged in court (Report of the Scientific Affairs
Committee, 1994). The statistical rationale behind banding has been upheld in various
court cases (Bridgeport Guardians v. City of Bridgeport, 1991; Office for Justice v. Civil
Service Commission, 1992). Thus, the psychometric and statistical rationale for placing
scores in a band is beyond legal dispute. It is nonrandom selection of applicants from
within a band that rests on questionable legal footing. However, these court cases have
not supported banding when it is used with minority preference. Banding allows for
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choices to be made on some criteria other than test scores such as job experience,
seniority, prior job performance, licensing, etc. It was recommended that professional
conduct, education, and training/experience be used as the secondary criteria in the
Officers v. CSC (1992) case (Gutman & Christiansen, 1997; Campion et al., 2001).
However, when group membership (i.e., race and sex) is the variable used to break ties
within the band, its legality is questionable. The most recent and relevant rulings from the
Supreme Court (the University of Michigan cases: Gratz et al. vs. Bollinger el al., 2003;
Grutter vs. Bollinger el al., 2003) have failed to unambiguously answer the question as to
whether group membership can be used to select applicants within bands. Thus, the door
to using banding to achieve the goals of high utility and workforce diversity has been left
open.
The Present Study
Most utility estimates, regardless of banding issues, make one assumption: job
offers will be accepted 100% of the time. Murphy (1986) found that utility estimates
overestimate utility gains by 30%-S0% when this assumption is not met. To this point, no
one has examined the utility of banding as well as the diversity increases of banding
when the assumption of 100% job offer acceptance is not met. The present study will do
so.
Hypothesis la: Utility differences between top down selection and sliding bands
with race preferential selection will be reduced when some of the top scoring applicants
refuse or are not offered the job.
Murphy (1986) reported that more than 35% of job offers are turned down in the
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technical and engineering fields and more than 25% of jobs are turned down in nontechnical fields. Candidates who no longer desire a specific job can be expected to refuse
that job offer. This refusal can occur because the candidate has already accepted or plans
to accept an alternative job, has plans to pursue other opportunities, or because of
personal reasons. It is unknown whether the refusal of job offers will affect the gains in
diversity offered by sliding bands with minority preference versus strict top down
selection.
Hypothesis lb: Adverse impact differences between top down selection and
sliding bands with race preferential selection will be reduced when some of the top
scoring applicants refuse or are not offered the job.
Intuitively, the highest scoring minorities can also be expected to turn down the
job at a higher rate than the higher scoring majorities. This follows the logic that high
scoring minorities are more likely to be in demand by various organizations than their
high scoring majority counterparts and are therefore more likely to turn down job offers
because of their available options. Thus, another hypothesis was created to illustrate what
would happen to utility and adverse impact if minorities turned down the job at a higher
rate than minorities.
Hypothesis 2a: Utility differences between top down selection and sliding bands
with race preferential selection will be reduced when high scoring minority applicants
refuse offers at a rate higher than high scoring majority applicants.
Hypothesis 2b: Adverse impact differences between top down selection and
sliding bands with race preferential selection will be reduced when high scoring minority
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applicants refuse offers at a rate higher than high scoring majority applicants.

Method
Data Generation
Normally distributed test score data were generated using a program created in the
C programming language. The simulated data were used to represent applicant test scores
for both minority and majority groups. The majority group applicants were randomly
generated in a population with a mean score of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The
minority group applicants were randomly generated in a population with a mean score of
85 and a standard deviation of 15. Thus, minority group members 1 scores were modeled
to average one standard deviation lower than majority group members (Sackett & Roth,
1991). Scores were then rounded to their nearest whole number. Simulated applicants
were then selected from the total applicant pool through use of strict top down and sliding
bands with race preferential selection strategies.
We simulated field conditions in which each applicant pool had a fixed
percentage of minority and majority applicants (50% for each group). We selected a
condition of equal representation in the applicant pool because Sackett and Roth's (1991)
study showed the best results for banding (in terms of highest adverse impact ratios)
when the applicant pool was evenly divided. The within group standard deviation (15),
reliability (.9), and confidence value (95%, one tailed) were then used to compute the
bandwidth, which was calculated to be 11.07 points. The two selection methods (strict
top down and sliding band with minority preference) were then applied to the total
simulated applicant pool. The following variables were used to model applicant scores:
1. Total Selection ratio (across both groups): 10% and 30%.
3. Total sample size: 100 and 600.
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3. Percent of job offers that would be accepted if the applicant was offered the job: 100%
for both groups, 90% for both groups, and 90% for majority group / 80% for minority
group.
For those conditions in which some of the job offers would not be accepted, the
dichotomous variable of rejecting/accepting the job offer was generated in a manner such
that it correlated approximately .5 (correlations range from .45 to .55) with applicant test
score; that is, higher scoring applicants (presumably with more job opportunities) were
more likely to reject the job offer. One thousand simulations were run for each condition.
Analyses
For all analyses, the dependent variables were the mean test score of all selected
applicants and the adverse impact ratios for each of the selection strategies. Each
simulation in each condition yielded four dependent variables: mean test score with top
down selection, mean test score with sliding bands with race preferential selection,
adverse impact ratio with top down selection, and adverse impact ratio with sliding bands
with race preferential selection. We computed the difference between mean test scores
and adverse impact ratios which reduced the number of dependent variables from four to
two for simulation for each condition. Thus, each dependent variable reflected the
difference in either utility or adverse impact ratios that would be obtained from the two
selection strategies. Mean differences between conditions were examined with
independent samples t tests.

Results
Tables 1 and 2 list the mean (averaged across 1000 simulations) adverse impact
ratios and mean test scores of candidates selected for the job through the use of strict top
down and sliding band with minority preference selection strategies. Table 1 illustrates
results when the sample size is 100 and Table 2 illustrates results when the sample size is
600. The tables summarize data from the 10% and 30% selection ratios crossed with the
100%o, 90%, and 90% (majority) / 80% (minority) job acceptance rates.
The results show a number of findings, some expected, others unexpected. Results
were nearly identical for both the 100 and 600 sample size conditions; however, there
were a few more deviant results when the sample size was 100. As expected, strict top
down selection produced higher mean test scores. Utility (as indexed by mean score of
applicants hired) is lower for higher selection ratios. Within each condition, adverse
impact ratios were better and utilities were worse for banding based selection versus top
down selection. Both utility and adverse impact ratios are lower when high scoring
applicants decline the job offer. Finally, when minorities turn down the job at a rate
greater than majorities and banding is used to make selection decisions, utility increases
and adverse impact ratios decrease.
A couple of unexpected results were also observed. First, in a number of
instances, banding based selection resulted in lower adverse impact ratios at higher
selection ratios. This finding is contrary to existing research (Sackett & Wilk, 1994),
which shows higher (i.e., better) adverse impact ratios for higher selection ratios. Second,
adverse impact ratios under top down selection actually improved when high scoring
minority candidates refused the job offer at rates higher than majority candidates.
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Table 1
Mean Test Scores of Selected Applicants (Utility) and
Adverse Impact when N = 100
Total

Mean Score

Mean Score

Adverse

Adverse

Selection

(Utility)

(Utility)

Impact

Impact

Ratio

TOD Down

Banding

Top Down

Banding

100% Job Acceptance Rates
10

120.8

119.1

16.1

81.8

30

111.3

110.1

29.1

79.2

90% Job Acceptance Rates
10

114.3

112.6

15.6

79.3

30

105.0

103.6

25.8

75.8

90% Majority and 80% Minority Job Acceptance Rates
10

114.8

113.3

20.2

79.1

30

105.1

103.9

24.2

66.4

Note. All entries are mean scores across 1000 simulations. When jobs w ere accepted
90%, majority and minority group members turned down the job at a .49 correlation with
their score. When jobs were accepted by 90% of majority group member and 80% of
minority group members, majority group members turned down the job at a .48
correlation and minority group members turned down the job at a 50 correlation with
their test score.
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Table 2
Mean Test Scores of Selected Applicants (Utility) and
Adverse Impact when N = 600
Total

Mean Score

Mean Score

Adverse

Adverse

Selection

(Utility)

(Utility)

Impact

Impact

Ratio

Top Down

Banding

Top Down

Band i nti

100% Job Acceptance Rates
10

121.3

119.7

14.6

68.4

30

111.5

110.3

28.7

76.8

90% Job Acceptance Rates
10

115.3

113.7

15.0

68.3

30

105.5

104.3

26.1

73.4

90% Majority and 80%> Minority Job Acceptance Rates
10

115.5

114.0

16.8

64.1

30

105.6

104.3

22.6

61.0

Note. All entries are mean scores across 1000 simulations. When jobs were accepted
90%, majority and minority group members turned down the job at a .46 correlation with
their score. When jobs were accepted by 90%) of majority group member and 80%) of
minority group members, majority group members turned down the job at a .46
correlation and minority group members turned down the job at a .51 correlation with
their test score.
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Decreasing the representation of minority candidates relative to majority candidates
should lower adverse impact (i.e., make it worse). Given that these results reflect the
average across 1000 simulations, sampling error is an unlikely cause.
With regard to our hypotheses, the results were mixed. Hypothesis la stated that
the utility difference between selection strategies (top down versus sliding band with
minority preference) would narrow when some high scoring applicants (10% of minority
and 10% of majority) refused the job offer. To test this (and all subsequent hypotheses),
we conduced independent sample t tests between the 100% acceptance simulations and
the simulations in which some of the applicants refused the job offer. For each
hypothesis, four comparisons were made: 100% job acceptance compared with less than
100% job acceptance at each corresponding selection ratio (10% or 30%) for both sample
sizes (100 or 600). Unfortunately, Hypothesis la was only supported in one of the four
comparisons (n = 600, 10% selection ratio),

1998) = 2.74,p < .05. Given only one

significant result out of four and given that in one of the other three comparisons, the
mean difference was large enough to be significant in the -wrong direction (i.e., the utility
difference actually increased), we conclude that Hypothesis la was not supported.
Results were similarly mixed for Hypothesis lb, which stated that adverse impact
difference between the two strategies would narrow when higher scoring applicants from
both groups refused the job offer. Independent samples t tests revealed significant mean
differences in only one of the four comparisons (n = 600, 30% selection ratio), ^(1998) =
2.56,/? < .05. Thus, we conclude Hypothesis lb was not supported. In short, differences
in utility and adverse impact between the alternative selection strategies (top down versus
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banding) do not change when higher scoring applicants from both groups refuse the job
offer in equal proportions.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b, similar to Hypotheses la and lb, stated that utility and
adverse impact differences between the selection strategies would narrow when high
scoring minority group members refused the job at higher rates than majority group
members. Similar to the results found for Hypothesis la, the results for Hypothesis 2a
were mixed, with significant differences for two of the four comparisons (n = 100, 10%
selection ratio and n = 600, 10% selection ratio), ^(1998) = 5.68. p < .05 and /(1998) =
14.74,/? < .05. respectively. Thus, we conclude that Hypothesis 2a was not supported.
Hypothesis 2b, however, was supported with significant results in all four comparisons,
/'(l998) = 2.84, p < .05 for the least significant comparison. Thus, we conclude that
although utility differences between the selection strategies remain constant the
differences in adverse impact between the two selection strategies diminish (banding
becomes profoundly less effective at hiring minorities) when minorities refuse the job
offer more often than majority group members.

Discussion
Previous studies (e.g., Cascio, 1991; Sackett and Roth. 1991) have established the
costs (lower test utility) and benefits (reduced adverse impact problems) associated with
the use of sliding bands with minority preference as compared to strict top down
selection. Unfortunately, all job offers are not accepted by applicants, reducing the utility
of testing (Murphy. 1986). The effects of rejected job offers on banding based selection
as compared with top down selection strategies have not been examined to date. Our
study attempted to identify and model the true costs and benefits of banding (utility and
adverse impact) in a simulation that resembles the reality of selection (i.e., with rejected
job offers). We found that on an absolute level, both utility and adverse impact ratios
were lowered for both top down and sliding band selection when applicants refused the
job offer, but the differences between the selection strategies in terms of utility and
adverse impact ratios were unchanged as long as members of both groups refused the job
in the same proportion. When minority group applicants refused the job offer at a rate
greater than the majority group (20% versus 10% job offer rejection rates, respectively),
utility differences between the two selection strategies were again unchanged, but the
difference in adverse impact ratios (again, between the available selection strategies)
were reduced. Thus, the benefit of using banding as opposed to top down selection, in
terms of more favorable adverse impact ratios, was smaller in magnitude w hen minority
group members refused job offers at a rate greater than the majority group.
The only limitations with our study concerned the realism of the assumptions used
in our model. Specifically, if minority group members refuse job offers at a rate equal to
or less than majority group members, then Hypothesis 2b (minority group members
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refuse the job at a higher rate than majorities), although supported in our analyses, would
be irrelevant. Alternatively, if minority group members refuse job offers at a rate greater
than majority group members, then the benefits of banding in terms of more desirable
adverse impact ratios over top down selection would be further reduced.
Future research regarding the costs and benefits of banding should explore two
avenues. First, the previously mentioned job offer rejection rates should be modeled to
include even more skewed ratios (e.g., 0% rejection for majority group versus 20% for
minority group). Second, the relative size of the majority and minority groups in the
applicant pool should also be modeled to ratios other than the 50/50 split used in this
study. We employed an equal representation condition because Sackett and Roth's (1991)
analysis demonstrated it to have the best results (i.e., biggest benefit) in terms of adverse
impact. Other, more skewed ratios might accelerate the decline in benefits in terms of
adverse impact for banding based selection strategies.
The use of sliding bands with minority preference for selection offers clear
benefits to the employer at little cost to test utility (Sackett & Roth, 1991). The research
presented here indicates that the benefits might not be as great as previously thought.
Furthermore, the legality of using a minority preference rule to break the ties within
bands is questionable given the most recent Supreme Court rulings. Future research or
future litigation might invalidate any benefit associated with banding and render (or
expose) the selection strategy to be functionally impotent.
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